We introduce a simple, geometric model of opinion polarization. It is a model of political persuasion, as well as marketing and advertising utilizing social values. It focuses on the interplay between different topics and wide-reaching persuasion efforts in the media. We discuss some exploratory examples, analyzing how polarization occurs and evolves. We also examine some computational aspects of choosing the most effective means of influencing agents in our model, along with connections of those computational considerations with polarization.
Introduction
Opinion polarization is a widely acknowledged social phenomenon, especially in the context of political opinions [FA08, SH15, IW15] , leading to recent concerns over "echo chambers" created by mass media [Pri13] and social networks [CRF + 11, Par11, BMA15, BAB + 18, Gar18] . The objective of this paper is to propose a simple, geometric model of the dynamics of polarization that models how opinion structure (that is, correlations within the population's opinions on various topics) can change under advertising or political campaigns.
Many models have been proposed to explain how polarization arises, and this remains an active area of research [NSL90, Axe97, Noa98, HK02, MKFB03, BB07, DGL13, DVSC + 17, KP18, SCP + 19]. Our attempt aims at simplicity over complexity. As opposed to a large majority of previous works, we neglect the social network structure and interactions between individuals. Instead, we focus on influences of (advertising or political) campaigns that reach a wide segment of the population. Our main psychological assumption is biased assimilation [LRL79] : people tend to be receptive to opinions they agree with, and antagonistic to opinions they disagree with.
Another distinguishing feature of our model is the multi-dimensional setting, reflecting the fact that campaigns can touch on many diverse topics. For example, in the context of American politics, one might wonder why should there be a significant correlation between opinions of individuals on, say, abortion access, gun rights and urgency of climate change. Our model attempts to illustrate how such correlations between opinions can arise as a (possibly unintended) effect of advertising exploiting different topics and social values.
In mathematical terms, we consider a population of agents with preexisting opinions represented by vectors in R d , normalized such that the Euclidean length of each vector is 1. Each coordinate represents an independent topic, and the value of the coordinate reflects the agent's opinion on the topic, which can be positive or negative. We then consider a sequence of interventions affecting the opinions. An intervention is also a unit vector in R d , representing the set of opinions expressed in, e.g., an advertising campaign or "news cycle". Therefore, all opinions and interventions in our model lie on the unit sphere in R d .
We model the effect of intervention v on an agent's opinion u in the following way. Supposing an agent has opinion u ∈ R d , after receiving an intervention v, they will update the opinion to the unit vector proportional to
where η > 0 is a global parameter that controls the influence of an intervention. Most of our results do not depend on a choice of η and in our examples we often take η = 1 for the sake of simplicity. Smaller values of η could model campaigns with limited persuasive power.
Intuitively, the agent evaluates the received message in context of their existing opinion, and assimilates this message weighted by their "agreement" with it. As mentioned, our dynamics exhibits biased assimilation in that if the intervening opinion v is positively correlated with an agent's opinion u, then after the update the agent opinion moves towards v, and conversely, if v is negatively correlated with u, then the update moves u away from v and towards the opposite opinion −v.
There are multiple scenarios that our model could reflect. One way to think of the intervention is as an exposure to persuasion by a political actor, like a political campaign message. Another example, in the context of marketing, is a product advertisement that exploits values besides the quality of the product. In that context, we can think of one of the d coordinates of the opinion vector as representing one's opinion on a product being introduced into the market and the remaining coordinates as representing preexisting opinions on other (e.g., social or political) issues. Then, an intervention would be an advertising effort to connect the product with a certain set of opinions or values [VSL77] . Some examples are corporate advertising campaigns supporting LGBT rights [Sny15] or gun manufacturers associating their products with patriotism [SVS04] . More broadly, another example of an intervention could be a company (e.g., a bank or an airline [For18] ) announcing its refusal to do business with the gun advocacy group NRA. It seems plausible to us that such advertising strategies can have a double effect of convincing potential customers who share relevant values and antagonizing those who do not.
Furthermore, it seems conceivable (and, as shown later, will provably happen in some settings in our model) that such interventions, even if intending mainly to increase sales and without direct intention to polarize, can have a side effect of increasing the extent of polarization in the society. For example, it might be that, in a population with initial opinions distributed uniformly, a number of interventions introduces some weak correlations. In our model, these correlations can be profitably exploited by advertisers in subsequent interventions. As a side effect, the interventions strengthen the correlations and increase polarization.
For example, suppose that after various advertising campaigns, people who tend to like item A (say, electric cars) tend to be liberal, and people who like a seemingly unrelated item B (say, firearms) tend to be conservative. This may result from the advertisers exploiting some obvious connections, e.g., between electric cars and responding to climate change, and between firearms and the right to bear arms, making liberal consumers more likely to favor electric cars and making conservative consumers more likely to favor firearms. Subsequently, future advertisements for electric cars may feature other values associated with liberals in America to appeal to potential consumers: for example, an advertisement might show a gay couple driving to their wedding in an electric car. Similarly, future advertisements for firearms may appeal to conservative values for similar reasons. The end result is not only that the buyers of electric cars and firearms become polarized, but also that society becomes more polarized along the political axis by the incorporation of political topics into advertisements.
Throughout our paper, we analyze properties of our model in a couple of scenarios. With respect to the interventions, we consider two scenarios: either there is one entity (an influencer ) trying to persuade agents to adopt their opinion or there are two influencers pushing different agendas. We also consider two cases with respect to the time scale: either the influencer(s) can apply arbitrarily many interventions, i.e., the asymptotic setting, or they need to maximize influence with bounded interventions, i.e., the short-term setting. The questions asked are: (i) What sequence of interventions should be applied to achieve a given influencer's objective? (ii) What are the computational resources needed to compute this optimal sequence? (iii) What are the effects of applying the interventions on the population's opinion structure? We give partial answers to those questions. The gist of them is that in most cases, applying desired interventions increases the polarization of agents.
In the asymptotic setting we use a very strong notion of polarization: we say that agents polarize if there exists a pair of antipodal points such that all opinions converge to one of them. Of course this is not meant to be taken literally. Rather, we postulate that in a more complicated system a similar, weaker dynamics might occur on a shorter time scale.
Before we describe our results, we discuss some limitations of our approach. We present a basic model intended to capture one mode of emergence of polarization. Most importantly and in contrast to overwhelming majority of existing literature, our model neglects opinion changes induced by interactions between individuals. Furthermore, we do not address aspects such as replacement of the population or unequal exposure and effects of the interventions. We do not consider any external influences on the population in addition to the interventions. We also do not confront theoretical and empirical research suggesting that in certain settings exposure to conflicting views can decrease polarization [PT06, MS10, GMGM17, GGPT17] or even questioning the overall extent of polarization in the society [FAP05, BG08] . As a matter of fact, applying a sequence of random interventions in our model results in the polarization of opinions (but we also present an example where total polarization does not occur). We leave addressing these limitations for the future.
While we sometimes discuss the uniform distribution of initial opinions on R d , we do not claim that it is the most plausible one and we do not make assumptions about the initial distribution in most of our results. We assume that any group of topics can be combined into an intervention with the effect given by (1). We expect that a more plausible model might feature some "internal" correlations between topics in addition to "external" correlations arising out of the agents' opinion structure. For example, topics may have related meaning, causing inherent correlations between corresponding opinions (e.g., being positive on renewable energy and recycling). Furthermore, there are certain topics (e.g., undesirability of murder) on which nearly all members of the population share the same inclination. As a matter of fact, it is common for marketing strategies to exploit unobjectionable social values (see, e.g., [VSL77] ). However, we presume that under suitable circumstances (e.g., due to inherent correlations we just mentioned) the "polarizing" topics might present a more appealing alternative for a campaign. Our model concerns such a case, where the "unifying" topics might be neglected and excluded from the analysis.
One property of our model is that an effect of an intervention using opinion v is exactly the same as for the opposite opinion −v. This might look like a cynical assumption about human nature, but arguably it is not entirely inaccurate. For example, experiments on social media show that not only exposure to similar ideas increases polarization (the "echo chamber" effect), but also exposure to the opinions opposite to one's own causes beliefs to become more extreme and polarized [BAB + 18]. Furthermore, in our model this effect occurs only if all the components of an opinion are negated.
We also note that our representation of opinions contains some ambiguities. A "weak" opinion u i,k ≈ 0 might signify each of: neutrality, lack of confidence, or lack of interest in a given subject. More generally, we assume that the agents have a "fixed budget" (one unit in Euclidean norm) of opinions that they always fully use. On the one hand, one might expect that different kinds of opinions will update in different manners: a confident neutral opinion might be harder, while a weak extreme opinion easier to change. On the other hand, there are psychological reasons to expect that, e.g., "issue interest" and "extremity of opinion" are correlated [LBS00, Bal07] (see also the discussion in [BB07] ).
Finally, we do not study how small modifications of our model, e.g., using a different norm or a different normalization method, modify its behavior.
Related works
As mentioned, there is a multitude works modeling polarization in different contexts [NSL90, Axe97, Noa98, HK02, MKFB03, BB07, DGL13, DVSC + 17, KP18, SCP + 19]. Most of them deal with polarization across a single dimension induced by interactions between individuals. One of the exceptions that studies biased assimilation with opinions on multiple topics is by Baldassarri and Bearman [BB07] . As a matter of fact, they use a different updating rule to observe a contrasting dynamics: in their simulations, polarization on one issue typically does not result in polarization on others. There is also a class of models [Axe97, Noa98, MKFB03] that concern multi-dimensional opinions where an opinion on a given topic takes one of finitely many values (e.g., + or -). These models do not seem to have a geometric structure similar to ours and the works studying them usually focus on formation of discrete groups in the society rather than total polarization. Yet another model [PPTF17] uses a geometric (affine) rule of updating multi-dimensional opinions. However, they seem to be modeling pre-existing, "intrinsic" correlations between topics rather than emergence of new ones and they are concerned mostly with convergence and stability of their dynamics.
There is an extensive line of models of opinion exchange on networks with peer interactions, where individuals encounter neighboring agents' opinions and update their own opinions based on, e.g., pre-defined friend/hostile relations [SPJ + 16], or the similarity and relative strength of opinions [MS10] . This branch of work often attributes polarization to homophily of one's social network [DGL13] (caused by, e.g., selfselection of social relations and segregation of like-minded people [WMKL15] and exacerbated by social media [Par11] ). A parallel proposed mechanism is biased assimilation [LRL79, DGL13] : the tendency to reinforce one's original opinions regardless if other encountered opinions align with them or not.
Another branch of work concerns how global information outlets influence the formation of public opinion. For example, [AO11] discusses the setting where all agents update their opinions in a Bayesian way, asking whether a global outlet of information (such as mass media, prominent individuals, or the state) can manipulate the population's opinions. In classical work on the formation of mass opinion [Zal92] , it is proposed that each individual has political dispositions (rooted in one's own life experience, education and previous encounters) that intermediate between the message they encounter and the political statement they make. Therefore, hearing the same political message can cause different thinking processes and changes in political preferences in different individuals.
Our model suggests that under the conditions of biased assimilation, opinion manipulation by one or several global information outlets can unintentionally lead to a strong form of polarization. Not only do people polarize on individual issues, but also their opinions on previously unrelated issues become correlated. This form of polarization is particularly related to issue alignment [BG08] discussed in political science and sociology literature. Issue alignment refers to an opinion structure where the population's opinions on multiple (relatively independent) issues correlate. It can be compared to issue radicalization, where the opinions polarize for each issue separately. Issue alignment is theorized to pose constraints on the opinions an individual can take, resulting in polarized and clustered mass opinions even when the opinions are not extreme in each single topic, and presenting more obstacles for social integration and political stability compared to issue radicalization [BG08] . In light of this, one way to view our model is as a mathematical mechanism by which this strong form of polarization can arise and worsen due to companies, politicians and media's natural attempts to gain support from the public.
Organization and contents of the paper In Section 2 we give precise definition of the model. In Section 3 we present two simulated examples exhibiting how polarization increases as a result of interventions.
In both examples we consider points sampled from a uniform distribution on the sphere. The first example shows a clear pattern of polarization when a fixed intervention is applied repeatedly. In the second example we apply two orthogonal interventions in an alternating fashion. Interestingly, the opinions do not completely polarize, suggesting that polarization in our model is not inevitable.
In Section 4 we discuss a setting with one influencer who has a large number of interventions at their disposal. We show that in this case finding an optimal sequence of interventions is equivalent to finding a hemisphere that is densest, i.e., contains the maximum number of agent opinions. As one consequence, if the preexisting opinions are random points on a sphere, the optimal intervention strategy results in total polarization: the agents are divided into two roughly equal groups that converge to two antipodal points.
The densest hemisphere problem turns out to be equivalent to the previously studied problem of learning noisy halfspaces, allowing us to apply known algorithmic and computational hardness results. In particular, a work by Guruswami and Raghavendra [GR09] implies that in the worst case (where the opinions are chosen in an adversarial fashion) it is computationally infeasible even to compute any non-trivial approximation for the densest hemisphere. On the other hand, in another work Ben-David and Simon [BDS00] show an efficient algorithm that finds a dense hemisphere, provided that the hemisphere is "stable" in the sense that it is dense even after deleting points which are close to its separating hyperplane.
In Section 5 we study the short-term scenario where the influencer can apply only one intervention. We consider the "marketing" interpretation, where the last coordinate corresponds to a new product on the market (and is therefore initially set to 0 for every agent) and the influencer's objective is to bring the value of this coordinate above a certain threshold T > 0 for as many agents as possible.
In Section 5.1, we analyze some tradeoffs in a scenario with only two agents. We discuss two natural interventions that can be used by the influencer: One that "unifies" the agents, persuading them in equal measure, and one that is fully focused on one of the agents, "antagonizing" the other. We show that choosing antagonizing over unifying strategy results in greater polarization and quantify the difference, calling it polarization cost. We discuss some examples where it might be rational for a self-interested influencer to pursue the antagonizing strategy, imposing the polarization cost onto the society.
In Section 5.2, we discuss the problem of finding an optimal intervention with an arbitrary number of agents. Interestingly, we show that this problem is equivalent to a generalization of the densest hemisphere problem from the long-term scenario discussed in Section 4. More precisely, it is equivalent to finding a densest spherical cap of a given radius (that depends on the threshold T ).
Finally, in Section 6, we analyze behavior of a system where there are two "dueling" influencers, such that at each time step one of the two influencers is selected at random and their respective intervention is applied. We show that in this scenario the opinions also polarize in a certain sense.
The Model
We consider a group of n agents, whose opinions are represented by unit vectors in R d , where we think of each component as representing an independent topic. It might be useful to think of n as much larger than d, though our results do not assume this. We will look into how those opinions change after receiving a sequence of interventions. Each intervention is also a unit vector in R d , representing the opinion contained in a message that the influencer (e.g., an advertiser) broadcast to the agents. Our model features one parameter: η > 0, signifying how strongly an intervention influences the opinions.
After each intervention, the agents update their opinions by moving towards or away from the intervention vector, depending on whether or not they agree with it (which is determined by the inner product between the vector v and the opinion vector), and normalizing suitably. Suppose the agents' initial opinions are u 1 , . . . , u n , ||u i || = 1, and an intervention v is applied, then the updated opinions u 1 , . . . , u n are given by
(2)
where we note that
by expanding out the definition of w i . Note in particular that this implies that w i ≥ 1, and consequently that u i is well-defined. The norm in (3) and everywhere else throughout is the standard Euclidean norm. Note that applying v and −v always yields the same results.
Preliminaries
We introduce some definitions that are useful in analyzing the model. We sometimes consider homogeneous open halfspaces, which are halfspaces whose boundary hyperplane contains the origin. In other words, a homogeneous halfplane is a set of the form {u ∈ R d : u, v > 0} for some v ∈ R d . Accordingly, if not otherwise indicated, whenever we refer to a halfspace, we assume it is homogeneous and open. We also call an intersection of a homogeneous open halfspace with the unit sphere a hemisphere.
We also use the notions of conical combination and convex cone. A conical combination of points u 1 , . . . , u n ∈ R d is any point of the form n i=1 α i u i where α i ≥ 0 for every i. A convex cone is a subset of R d that is closed under finite conical combinations of its elements. Given a finite set of points S ⊆ R d , the convex cone generated by S is the smallest convex cone that contains S.
Objectives
We analyze the strategy of influencers in several settings.
In an "asymptotic scenario", the influencer asks for an infinite sequence of interventions v (1) , v (2) , . . . , that maximizes how many of the n agent opinions converge to the target vector (0, . . . , 0, 1). As is standard, we say that a sequence of vectors u 1 , · · · , u t converges to a vector v if lim t→∞ ||u t i − v|| = 0. One way to interpret this scenario is that a campaigner wants to influence as many people as possible close to hold an opinion close to v to establish a solid base of support for the party platform.
In a "multiple-influencer asymptotic scenario", two influencers (such as two companies or two parties) who have different objectives apply their two respective interventions on the population in a certain order. We ask how the opinions change under such competing influences. This scenario can be interpreted as two parties campaigning their agendas to a population, whose opinions are shaped by the simultaneous exposure to these two types of messages.
In a "short-term scenario", the influencer assumes some fixed threshold 0 < T < 1, and an upper bound K on the number of interventions, and asks, given n opinions u 1 , . . . , u n , how to choose v 1 , · · · , v K in order to maximize the number of time-K opinions u
One interpretation is that advertisers only have a limited number of opportunities to publicize their products to consumers, and consumers with u (K) i > T will decide to buy the product after the interventions v 1 , · · · , v K are applied.
There are several possible variants of our model that we find potentially interesting but do not address in this paper. For example:
• "Targeting", where the influencer can select subgroups of the population and apply interventions groupwise.
• Perturbing preferences with noise after each step.
• Replacement of the population, e.g., introducing new agents with "fresh" opinions or removing agents that stayed in the population for a long time or who already "bought" the product, i.e., exceeded the threshold u i,d > T . For example, this could correspond to "one-time" purchase product like a house or a fridge, or situations where the customer's opinion is more difficult to change as time passes.
• Models where the initial opinions are not observable or partially observable.
• Expanding the model by adding peer effects and social network structure and exploring the resulting dynamics of polarization and opinion formation.
• One could consider multiple adaptive influencers who decide on their interventions based on preceding interventions by other influencers. Then, resulting equilibrium of opinion formation could be analyzed.
Illustrative Examples
In this section we give some illustrative examples of the dynamics of our model, by using simulations with η set to 1 in Equation 1.
One advertiser short-term scenario
To illustrate our model, suppose an advertiser is marketing a new product. The opinion of the population has four dimensions. The population consists of 500 agents, each with random initial opinions
The opinion on the new product is represented by the fourth coordinate, which is initially set to zero for all agents.
Suppose the advertiser chooses a strategy of repeatedly applying an intervention that couples the product with the preexisting opinion on the first coordinate. For example, an intervention vector could be v = ( √ 1 − α 2 , 0, 0, α) for α = 3/4. The evolution of the population's opinions over five consecutive broadcasts of v is illustrated in Figure 1 . The interventions increase the affinity for the product for some agents while antagonizing others. Furthermore, the interventions have a side effect that the agents' opinions on the first three coordinates also become polarized.
Two advertisers
For another slightly more involved example, suppose there are two advertisers marketing their products. Population's opinions now have five dimensions (d = 5) with the fourth and fifth coordinates corresponding to the opinions on these two products. Initially, 500 agents' opinions on the first three coordinates are distributed randomly and uniformly on a three-dimensional sphere, and the last two coordinates are set to zero.
Suppose the two advertisers apply interventions v 1 and v 2 in an alternating fashion. We take v 1 and v 2 to be orthogonal. For example, let
In Figure 2 we illustrate the agents' opinions after each advertiser applied its intervention two, four and six times (so the total of, respectively, four, eight and twelve interventions have been applied). A pattern of polarization on the fourth and fifth coordinates can be observed. At the same time, the pattern on the first three coordinates is more complicated: The agents' opinions on these dimensions are scattered around a circle on the plane spanned by the first two coordinates. This is a somewhat special behavior that arise because the vectors v 1 and v 2 are orthogonal. The explanation of the difference between orthogonal and non-orthogonal competing interventions in an analogous setting can be found in Section 6.
Figure 2: Two figures are displayed for time steps t = 2, 4, 6. The spatial positions of the points in both figures correspond to the first three dimensions (they are the same on both graphs). The colors encode opinions of the two products. The left column presents population's opinions on the first product (fourth coordinate). The right column presents the population's opinions on the second product (fifth coordinate). The distribution of points at t = 0 is uniform (cf. Figure 1) .
Long-Term Strategy: Computational Aspects
In this section we study the asymptotic scenario with one influencer. In this setting, one influencer wishes to propagate a fixed opinion v * ∈ R d . We assume that the influencer can use an unlimited number of interventions and their objective is to change the opinions of as many agents as possible to v * . More precisely, given the preexisting opinions of n agents, u 1 , . . . , u n , we want to find a sequence of interventions, v 1 , v 2 , v 3 . . . that maximizes the number of agents whose opinions converge to v * .
In the following, we first argue that this maximization problem is equivalent to identifying an open hemisphere that contains the maximum number of agents. Subsequently, we observe that previous work [BDS00, GR09] implies two claims. On the negative side, computing the densest hemisphere is hopelessly hard in the hardness of approximation sense. However, there exists an efficient algorithm that finds a dense hemisphere as long as the solution is "robust", i.e., there exists a half-space that contains a large number of agents' opinions even if its boundary is distorted by a small amount.
Equivalence to finding densest hemisphere
In this section we prove the following result showing equivalence of finding a good advertising strategy and finding an open hemisphere containing many points. One direction of the claim in Theorem 4.1 is straightforward:
Claim 4.2. If points u 1 , . . . , u k lie in a fixed hemisphere, then there is a strategy making all of u 1 , . . . , u k converge to v * .
Proof. Note that every open hemisphere is an intersection of an open, homogeneous halfspace with the unit sphere. Therefore, there is a vector a ∈ R d such that a, u i > 0 for every agent i = 1, . . . , k. By definition of our process, it is clear that by repeatedly broadcasting a, all the points will converge to a as time t → ∞ .
After all the points are clustered close enough to a, by a similar argument they can be "moved around" together towards another arbitrary point v * . For example, if v * , a > 0, the intervention v * can be applied repeatedly. If v * , a ≤ 0, one can proceed in two stages: First applying an intervention proportional to (v * + a)/2, and then v * . Remark 4.3. As a possible interpretation of the mechanism in Claim 4.2, it is not unheard of in campaigns on political issues to use an analogous strategy. First, build a consensus around a (presumably compromise) opinion. Then, "nudge" it little by little towards another direction.
In an extreme case one can imagine this mechanism even flipping the opinions of two polarized clusters. One example of this could be reversal of the opinions on certain issues of 20th century Republican and Democratic parties in the US (this particular phenomenon can be found in many texts, e.g. [KW18] ).
Next, we claim that the hemisphere condition is also necessary for the existence of a strategy to make agents' opinions converge. This is proved in Claim 4.7. First, we have a few more simple claims.
Claim 4.4. Suppose that for a given sequence of interventions the opinions u 1 , . . . , u n converge to the same point v * . Then, for any unit vector u n+1 that lies in the convex cone of u 1 , . . . , u n , we have that u n+1 also converges to v * .
Proof. It suffices to prove that if u n+1 lies in the convex cone of u 1 , . . . , u n , then after applying one intervention v the new opinion u n+1 lies in the convex cone of u 1 , . . . , u n . Then the claim follows by induction.
To prove this, we can simply write out u n+1 , using the relation u n+1 = n i=1 λ i u i (where we use the notation u ∝ v to mean that u = c · v for some constant c > 0):
where the constants in (5) are c i :
Specifically, they are all nonnegative, which finishes the proof.
Claim 4.5. Suppose there are two opinions u 1 , u 2 that are antipodal, i.e., u 1 = −u 2 . Then these two opinions will remain antipodal in future time steps. In particular, they will never converge to a single point.
Proof. This follows directly from (2), noting that, for any intervention v, we have
We will also use the following consequence of the separating hyperplane theorem:
Fact 4.6. A collection of unit vectors a 1 , . . . , a n cannot be put in the same halfspace if and only if the zero vector lies in the convex hull of a 1 , . . . , a n . Now we are ready to prove the final claim, establishing the reverse implication in Theorem 4.1.
Claim 4.7. Suppose that we start with agent opinions u 1 , . . . , u n and that there is no hemisphere that contains M of those opinions. Then, there is no strategy that makes M of the opinions converge to the same point.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that exists a strategy that makes M opinions converge to the same point, and assume wlog that they are u 1 , . . . , u M . By assumption, we know that there is no hemisphere that contains all of u 1 , . . . , u M . By assumption and by Fact 4.6, there is a convex combination of u 1 , . . . , u M that equals 0. Therefore, there is also a conical combination of u 1 , . . . , u M −1 that equals −u M , where wlog we assume that the coefficient on u M is initially nonzero.
By Claim 4.4, we conclude that if u 1 , . . . , u M −1 converge to the same point, then so does −u M . But that means that −u M and u M converge to the same point, which is a contradiction by Claim 4.5.
Remark 4.8. One consequence of Theorem 4.1 is that if the agent opinions are initially distributed uniformly on the unit sphere, an optimal strategy converging as many opinions as possible to v * results, with high probability, in dividing the population into two groups of roughly equal size, where the opinions inside each group converge to one of two antipodal limit opinions (i.e., v * and −v * ).
Corollary 4.9. The optimal strategy for an influencer to make as many opinions as possible to v * is to compute the halfspace that contains the most opinions, converge all opinions in the halfspace close enough to a point non-orthogonal to v * and move the small cluster to v * (by e.g., applying v * or −v * repeatedly.) The maximum number of people that will converge to v * is the maximum number of opinions that are contained in a halfspace among the initial opinions.
Computational equivalence to learning halfspaces
By Theorem 4.1, computing an optimal strategy to get the most people to agree with an opinion v * is equivalent to computing the hemisphere maximizing the number of agent opinions inside. In this section we discuss the computational consequences of this fact following from known results. It turns out that the densest hemisphere problem is closely related to finding a maximum agreement halfspace, studied in the context of learning halfspaces in perceptron problems. This problem can be stated as follows:
Definition 4.10 (Maximum Agreement Halfspace). In the problem of maximum agreement halfspace, given a labeled set of points D = {(x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x n , y n )} ∈ R d × {±1}, the objective is to find a halfspace H = {x : v, x > c} maximizing the agreement
n .
As pointed out in [BDS00] , there exists a reduction from the maximum agreement halfspace problem to the densest hemisphere problem that preserves the quality of solutions. Since this reduction is only briefly sketched in [BDS00], we describe it below.
The reduction proceeds as follows: Given a labeled set D = {(x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x n , y n )} ∈ R d × {±1}, we map it to D = {x 1 , . . . , x n } ∈ R d+1 using the formula
In other words, we proceed in three steps: First, we add a coordinate and set its value to 1 for every point x i . Second, we normalize each resulting point so that it lies on the unit sphere in R d+1 . Finally, we negate each point with the negative label y i = −1. This is a so-called "strict reduction", which is expressed in the following claim: 
Clearly, this is a one-to-one mapping between open halfspaces in R d and homogeneous open halfspaces in
Furthermore, it is easy to verify that y i · x i ∈ H if and only if x i ∈ H and therefore A(D, H) = |D ∩ H |/n.
The reduction allows us to use a strong hardness of approximation result from [GR09] (see also [FGKP06, BB06, BDEL03, AK98] for related work):
Theorem 4.12. Unless P=NP, for any ε > 0, there is no polynomial time algorithm that distinguishes the following, given an instance of maximum agreement halfspace problem:
• There exists a halfspace H such that A(D, H) > 1 − ε.
• For every halfspace H we have A(D, H) < 1/2 + ε.
In other words, it is computationally hard to distinguish between instances that have halfspaces with almost perfect agreement and instances where there is no halfspace with agreement noticeable larger than 1/2 (of course for any hyperplane, one of the two halfspaces defined by this hyperplane has an agreement at least 1/2). Consequently, unless P=NP, there is no polynomial time algorithm that, for any ε > 0, given an instance that has a halfspace with agreement 1 − ε, finds a halfspace with agreement more than 1/2 + ε. We note that the results in [GR09] show hardness for instances with dimension d comparable to the number of points n.
By standard (and easy) arguments from complexity theory, Claim 4.11 implies Theorem 4.13. Unless P=NP, for any ε > 0, there is no polynomial time algorithm that distinguishes between instances of densest hemisphere problem such that:
• Either there exists a hemisphere H such that |D ∩ H|/n > 1 − ε.
• Or for every hemisphere H we have |D ∩ H|/n < 1/2 + ε.
Consequently, unless P=NP there is no polynomial time algorithm that, given an instance D that has a hemisphere with density more than 1 − ε, outputs a hemisphere with density more than 1/2 + ε.
At the same time, [BDS00] (relying on earlier work [BDES02] ) shows that there exists an algorithm that finds a dense hemisphere provided that it is stable in the sense that it remains dense even after a small perturbation of its separating hyperplane:
Theorem 4.14 ([BDS00] ). For every η > 0, there exists a polynomial time algorithm that, given an instance D of the densest hemisphere problem, provides the following guarantee:
If there exists a halfspace H η = {x : v, x > η} such that |D ∩ H η |/n > α, then the algorithm outputs a hemisphere corresponding to a homogeneous halfspace H = {x : w, x > 0} such that |D ∩ H|/n > α.
As a consequence, if there exists shows a dense hemisphere that contains many opinions, and the opinions do not lie close to the separating hyperplane, there exists an efficient algorithm to find this hemisphere and persuade the agents.
Short-Term Strategies
The analysis of asymptotic setting with unlimited interventions tell us what is feasible and what is not. A fundamentally different question is how to persuade as many as possible with limited number of interventions. This is motivated by bounded resources or time that usually allow only limited placements of campaigns and advertisements. Furthermore, arguably only the initial interventions can be considered effective: in the long run the opinions might shift due to external factors and become more unpredictable and harder to control. Therefore, in this section we discuss influencer's strategies when it only has only one intervention at its disposal, and its goal is to get as many people as possible to have opinions close to v * . Throughout this section, we fix η = 1 in Equation 1, so an opinion u updates to be proportional to w = u + u, v · v.
One intervention, two agents: polarization costs
We start with an example that features only two agents and one influencer who is allowed one intervention. Same as in the illustrating examples in Section 3, we imagine a new product being introduced into the market such that the agents are initially agnostic about it, i.e., u i,d = 0 for i = 1, 2. Given an intervention v, we are interested in two issues: First, what will be new opinions of agents about the product u i,d ? Second, assuming that the initial correlation between opinions is c = u 1 , u 2 , what will be the new correlation c = u 1 , u 2 ? We think of the correlation as a measure of agreement between the agents and therefore interpret differences in correlation as the changes in the extent of polarization.
To analyze these effects it will be enough to consider only three dimensions d = 3. For concreteness, we assume that the two opinions are represented as u 1 := (sin α, cos α, 0) , u 2 := (− sin α, cos α, 0) , for 0 ≤ α ≤ π/2. Accordingly, we have c = cos 2 α − sin 2 α = cos(2α). In particular, α = 0 means that the agents are in full agreement, α = π/4 corresponds to the case of orthogonal opinions and α = π/2 is the case where the opinions are antipodal.
If the opinions u i,3 correlate with the probability of the agent buying the product (e.g., an agent will consider buying only if its opinion exceeds certain threshold u i,3 > T ), and assuming that producing as many sales as possible is the only thing that the influencer cares about, there are two natural choices for the intervention. One option is to apply v that will yield new opinions u 1 , u 2 such that min(u 1,3 , u 2,3 ) is maximized. This corresponds to the case when the influencer appeals to both agents with the hope of inducing two sales. The other case is to appeal only to one of the agents, for example, the first agent, and disregarding the second agent and concentrating only on one possible sale. In the following we analyze these two strategies, which we respectively call the "unifying" and "antagonizing" strategy. The two strategies are illustrated in Figure 3 . First, consider the antagonizing strategy where the influencer maximizes their appeal to the first agent. Clearly, the intervention should be of the form v = cos β · u 1 + sin β · (0, 0, 1) for some 0 ≤ β ≤ π/2. Substituting in (2), we compute (u 1,3 ) 2 = cos 2 β sin 2 β 1 + 3 cos 2 β .
Maximizing (6), we get cos β = √ 3/3 and u 1,3 = 1/3. The value 1/3 is the benchmark for what can be achieved by a single intervention: It is a maximum value for u 1,3 attainable provided that initially u 1,3 = 0.
What is the effect of this strategy on the other opinion u 2 ? Again substituting into (2), we get
The graph v 2,3 as a function of the correlation c ∈ [−1, 1] is shown in red in Figure 4 . In particular, the graph increases from −1/3 to 1/3, passing through 0 for c = 0.
Moving to the unifying strategy, in this case it is not difficult to see (cf. Figure 3 ) that the intervention vector should be of the form v = (0, cos β, sin β) for some 0 ≤ β ≤ π/2. A computation in computer algebra system (CAS) establishes that v 1,3 = v 2,3 is maximized for
yielding a somewhat complicated expression u 1,3 = u 2,3 = 3c + 7 − 2 √ 6c + 10 9(c + 1) .
This function is depicted in Figure 4 in blue. In particular, for c ∈ [−1, 1], it increases from 0 to 1/3 and its value at 0 is approximately 0.27. Furthermore, its growth close to c = −1 is of the square-root type.
Definition 5.1 (Polarization Cost). We define the polarization cost as the difference of correlation between two agents after an antagonizing intervention and after a unifying intervention, denoated as ρ, i.e. ρ = c uni − c ant . Note the polarization cost ρ is a function of the initial correlation of the two agents' opinions. If the influencer chooses the unifying strategy, the correlation c = u 1 , u 2 increases in comparison to the initial correlation c. On the other hand, in case of antagonizing strategy, if the initial correlation is negative c < 0, the correlation after intervention will decrease, increasing the polarization of opinions. We can think of the difference between final correlations u 1 , u 2 for the unifying and antagonizing strategies as an externality: the polarization cost imposed on the society by the influencer choosing the antagonizing over unifying approach.
Let us denote the correlations u 1 , u 2 in the unifying and antagonizing cases as, respectively, c uni and c ant . Another CAS computation gives
The polarization cost c uni − c ant is shown in Figure 4 Depending on their incentives, the influencer might choose the antagonizing strategy, forgoing a chance for a substantial increase in the agreement among the agents.
A more pronounced case of high polarization cost occurs if the initial opinions are already substantially polarized. For example, for c = −0.7 the unifying strategy has u 1,3 = u 2,3 ≈ 0.18 , c uni ≈ −0.41 , while the antagonizing strategy gives u 1,3 = 1/3 , u 2,3 ≈ −0.27 , c ant ≈ −0.81 .
Since the difference in u 1,3 is more pronounced, the influencer might have more incentive to apply antagonizing strategy resulting in a high polarization cost.
On the other hand, the polarization cost is low if the initial correlation c is either high or low. If c is close to 1, then there is not much difference between unifying and antagonizing interventions. On the other hand, if c is close to −1, then neither strategy changes the correlation much, while the unifying strategy has also little effect on the agents' opinions of the product.
One intervention, many agents: finding the densest spherical cap
A more general version of the problem of persuading with limited number of interventions features n agents with opinions u 1 , . . . , u n ∈ R d . The influencer is given a threshold 0 < T < 1 and can apply one intervention v with the objective of maximizing the number of agents such that u i,d ≥ T . The value T can be interpreted as a threshold above which a consumer decides to buy the advertised product, or more generally take a desired action, such as go to vote, donate, etc.
Assume that the agents are initially agnostic about the product (u i,d = 0). In that case we can also assume T ≤ 1/3, since 1/3 is the maximum value that can be achieved in the d-th coordinate by a single intervention, cf. (6). It turns out an analogy to the densest hemisphere problem can be observed. We show that after fixing the threshold T , the problem becomes equivalent to finding a spherical cap of a given radius in d − 1 dimensions that contains the maximum number of agent opinions. To state our result, let us abuse notation and write vectors u ∈ R d as u = (u * , u d ) for u * ∈ R d−1 , u d ∈ R:
Proposition 5.2. In the setting above, let
Then, the number of agents with u i,d ≥ T is maximized by applying an intervention v := (cos β · v * , sin β)
for v * ∈ R d−1 that maximizes the number of agents satisfying
Proof. Let us write a generic intervention vector as
where 0 ≤ β ≤ π/2, v * ∈ R d−1 and v * = 1. If v is applied to an opinion vector u i = (u * i , 0) and we let c i := u * i , v * , substituting into (2) we can compute
and therefore, using (4),
where we let z := cos β. Consider a fixed direction v * ∈ R d−1 . In order to maximize u i,d for a point u i with u * i , v * = c, we need to optimize over z in (8), resulting in z = √ 1 + 3c 2 − 1/( √ 3c) and, substituting,
Note that from the definitions it is clear that the right-hand side of (8) is increasing in c i for a fixed z. Therefore, in order to maximize the number of points with u i,d ≥ T for a fixed v * , we should solve the
for c, resulting in c = 2T 1−3T 2 and apply the intervention v = (cos β · v * , sin β) , just as claimed in (7). This intervention will succeed for all opinions satisfying
which means that the points u * i on which the objective u i,d ≥ T is achieved are exactly those contained in the spherical cap {x ∈ R d−1 : x, v * ≥ c}. Maximizing over all v * ∈ R d−1 completes the proof.
Note that the solution to this short-term problem for T going to zero approaches the densest hemisphere solution to the long-term problem discussed in Section 4.1.
Asymptotic Effects of Two Dueling Influencers
In this section we theoretically analyze a scenario where we have two influencers with differing agendas, represented by different 1 intervention vectors v and v . We consider the randomized setup, where at each time step, one of the influencers is randomly chosen to apply their intervention. We demonstrate that this setting also results, in most cases and in a certain sense, in the polarization of agents.
To make a more precise statement, first note that if an agent starts with an opinion u such that
applying v or v never changes their opinion. In Theorem 6.1 we show that if (10) does not hold and, additionally, v, v = 0, the opinion vector with probability 1 ends up either converging to the convex cone generated by v and v or the convex cone generated by −v and −v . In particular, since vectors u for which (10) holds form a set of measure 0, if n initial opinions are sampled i.i.d. from an absolutely continuous distribution, almost surely all opinions converge to the convex cones. Furthermore, we attempt to strengthen this notion of polarization. Note that we cannot hope for convergence to a fixed pair of antipodal points on the sphere: even for a single agent, their opinion will keep fluctuating due to random applications of different interventions. However, in Theorem 6.6 we prove that for larger values of the correlation v, v > √ 2/2 ≈ 0.71, and (almost all) starting opinions u 0 and u 0 , with probability 1 either the distance between u t and u t or between u t and −u t converges to 0. Informally, all opinions "converge" to two "moving" antipodal points in the convex cones. Our experiments suggest that this convergence occurs also for other values of v, v , but we do not prove it here.
Finally, we show that in the remaining case when v and v are orthogonal, the initial vector u 0 converges to the quadrant in which it starts with respect to v and v . Namely, for all t, we have that sgn ( u t , v ) = sgn ( u 0 , v ) and sgn ( u t , v ) = sgn ( u 0 , v ), and furthermore the distance between u t and the subspace spanned by v and v goes to 0 with t. This is proved in Corollary 6.5.
In the following we will always assume that 0 ≤ v, v < 1 and write v, v = cos(θ) for 0 < θ ≤ π/2. This is justified since if the correlation v, v was negative, we could negate v without changing effects of any interventions. Also, we will make use of linear subspaces V := span{v, v } and W := V ⊥ . In this context we shall write orthogonal decompositions of opinion vectors as u = u V + u W . Our first result states: Theorem 6.1. Let v, v > 0 and let a starting opinion u 0 be such that u 0 , v = 0 or u 0 , v = 0. Then, as t goes to infinity and almost surely, either the Euclidean distance between u t and the convex cone generated by v and v or between u t and the convex cone generated by −v and −v goes to 0.
Proof outline First, we show that the distance between u t and V almost surely goes to 0 as t → ∞, by showing that the norm of the projection of u t onto W converges to 0. This is proved in Proposition 6.2.
Then, we demonstrate that the convex cone spanned by v and v is absorbing: when the projection of u T onto V falls in the cone, then the projections of u t for t ≥ T always stay in the cone as well. This is proved in Proposition 6.3.
Finally, in Proposition 6.4 we show that almost surely the projection of u t onto V eventually enters either the cone spanned by v and v , or the cone spanned by −v and −v . More concretely, we show that at any time t, there is a sequence of T interventions that lands the projection of u t+T in one of the cones, for some T that is independent of t. Since this sequence occurs with probability 2 −T , which is independent of t, the opinion almost surely eventually enters one of the cones. Proposition 6.2. Let v, v ≥ 0 and take an opinion vector u such that u V = c ≥ 0. Furthermore, let u be the vector resulting from randomly intervening on u with either v or v . Then:
With probability at least
where α = 1 1+(2η+η 2 )· u,v * 2 is the normalizing constant. Observe that when we project onto W , the component in the direction of v * vanishes, so we have that u W = α · u W , and the first claim easily follows since α ≤ 1.
To establish the second point, we need to show that with probability 1/2 we have α 2 < 1 or, equivalently, u, v * 2 = u V , v * 2 > 0. If θ > 0, the projected vector u V cannot be orthogonal both to v and v (cf. Figure 5 ). More precisely, for at least one of v * ∈ {v, v } the primary angle between u and v * (or −v * ) must be at most π/2 − θ/2 and consequently | u V , v * | ≥ u V · | cos(π/2 − θ/2)| ≥ c · θ/4 , resulting in
Proposition 6.3. Let v, v ≥ 0 and take u to be an opinion vector and u to be a vector resulting from intervening on u with either v or v . If u V is a conical combination of v and v , then also u V is such a conical combination.
Proof. Assume wlog that the vector applied is v. Then,
Therefore, u V can be written as a nonnegative linear combination of u V and v, where we use the fact that u V , v is nonnegative, which follows since u V is a conical combination of v and v , and v, v ≥ 0. Next, we prove that when v, v > 0, the opinion u t not only approaches subspace V , but also a specific area of V , namely, either cone(v, v ) or cone(−v, −v ). Proof. First, for any vector u such that u V ≥ c > 0, it is clear that at least one of v, v , −v, −v has positive inner product with u (and u V ) which can be lower bounded by a function of c, θ, and η (see Figure 5 ). Take such a vector and call it v * . Applying it repeatedly will make u V arbitrarily close to v * (cf. Proposition 6.2).
Finally, after choosing the number of applications of v * such that both u − u V and u V − v * are small enough, we apply the other intervention vector (v or v ) once. It is clear that at this stage vector u V either already is in the convex cone (and the additional intervention keeps it inside) or the intervention with the other vector brings it inside the cone.
Therefore, there exists a sequence of T (c, θ, η) interventions that make u V enter cone(v, v ) or the cone(−v, −v ).
We combine Propositions 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 to show that when v, v = 0, almost any vector u eventually approaches one of the convex cones (cone(v, v ) or cone(−v, −v )) as time goes to infinity.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Let u V = c > 0. Proposition 6.2 tells us that the squared norm of the component u W in the subspace W = V ⊥ never increases, and with probability 1/2 decreases by a multiplicative factor (1−(η 2 /2+η)·c 2 θ 2 /16). By induction (note that c only increases with successive applications), u W converges to 0, and consequently u − u V converges to 0, almost surely.
In order to show that additionally convergence to one of the two convex cones occurs, we apply Proposition 6.4. Since at any time step t, there exists a sequence of T choices that puts u V in one of the convex cones, and since T depends only on the starting parameters c, θ, and η, we get that u V almost surely eventually enters one of the cones. By Proposition 6.3 and induction, once u V enters a convex cone, it never leaves.
As a corollary of Propositions 6.2 and 6.3, when v, v = 0, u V always stays in the quadrant it starts in.
Corollary 6.5. Let v, v = 0 and let an initial opinion u = u 0 be such that u, v = 0 and u, v = 0. Then, almost surely, the following facts hold:
2. For all t, sgn ( u t , v ) = sgn ( u 0 , v ) and sgn ( u t , v ) = sgn ( u 0 , v ).
Proof. The first statement is an inductive application of Proposition 6.2, exactly the same as in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
The second statement follows from noting that out of four orthogonal pairs of vectors {v, v }, {v, −v }, {−v, v }, or {−v, −v }, there is exactly one such that u V is a (strict) conical combination of this pair (by assuming u, v = 0 and u, v = 0 we avoid ambiguity in case u V is parallel to v or v ).
By the same argument as in Proposition 6.3 and by induction, if the initial projection u V is strictly inside one of the convex cones, it remains strictly inside forever.
Finally, we show that if the correlation v, v is large enough, for almost any two initial opinions u 0 and u 0 , the distance between them (or between one and negation of the other) almost surely converges to 0 as t goes to infinity. As mentioned in the beginning of the section, our experiments suggest that the condition on v, v is not necessary. We prove convergence for v, v > 1 2 + η > √ 2 2 ≈ 0.71 .
In particular, for η = 1 our result applies if v, v > √ 3/3 ≈ 0.58.
Theorem 6.6. Suppose that v, v > 1/ √ 2 + η and let u 0 , u 0 be such that (u 0 ) V = 0, (u 0 ) V = 0. Then, almost surely, either u t − u t converges to 0, or u t + u t converges to 0.
Proof. Consider the subspace V with some coordinate system (cf. Figure 5 ) imposed on it. As is standard, a unit vector u ∈ V can be represented in this system by its primary angle α(u) ∈ [0, 2π) as measured clockwise from the positive x-axis.
Given a unit vector v * ∈ V , let f v * : [0, 2π) → [0, 2π) be the function with the following meaning: Given a unit vector u ∈ V with angle α = α(u), the value f v * (α) = α(u ) represents the angle of vector u resulting from applying intervention v * to vector u. Note that α(v * ) is a fixed point of f v * . Also, the functions f v and f v map the the cone(v, v ) to itself.
The main part of our argument is the following lemma, which we prove last: 
where the distances |f v * (β) − f v * (α)| and |β − α| are in the metric induced by S 1 , i.e., "modulo 2π".
Lemma 6.7 implies that the angle distance between two opinions u t , u t ∈ V starting in the convex cone (deterministically) converges to 0 as t goes to infinity. Of course, this is equivalent to their Euclidean distance u t − u t converging to 0. We now make a continuity argument to show that convergence almost surely occurs also for u t , u t / ∈ V . To this end, we define g v , g v : S d−1 → [0, 2π) as natural extensions of f v , f v : the value g v * (u) denotes the angle of the projection u V of the new opinion onto V , after applying v * on opinion u (cf. Figure 5 ). Note that the value g v * (u) depends only on the angle α(u V ) and the projection length u W :
In this parametrization, for u ∈ V we have f v * (α(u)) = g v * (u) = g v * (α(u), 0). By Theorem 6.1, for any u 0 and u 0 satisfying the assumptions, almost surely there exists a t such that (u t ) V and (u t ) V end up inside (possibly different) convex cones. We consider the case of u t and u t both in cone(v, v ), other three cases being analogous. Furthermore, almost surely, (u t ) W and (u t ) W converge to 0. Hence, it is enough that we show that almost surely |α((u t ) V ) − α((u t ) V )| (again using S 1 distance) converges to zero.
To this end, let δ > 0. By uniform continuity of f v , we know that for small enough value of r = u W , we have |f v (α, r) − f v (α, 0)| < 1 − k 4 · δ for every α ∈ [0, 2π), where k is the Lipschitz constant from (11). Therefore, almost surely, for t large enough, for u t and u t parametrized as u t = (α, r) and u t = (α , r ) we have
Since k + (1 − k)/2 < 1, and applying the same argument to f v , we conclude by induction that the distance |α t − α t | must go and stay below δ in a finite number of steps. Since δ > 0 was arbitrary, it must be that |α t − α t | converges to 0, as claimed.
We conclude with the proof of Lemma 6.7:
Proof of Lemma 6.7. Let f := f (1,0) , i.e., f corresponds to the intervention along the x-axis. Clearly, functions f v and f v are cyclic shifts of f . More precisely, we have
where arithmetic in (12) is modulo 2π. Furthermore, f is symmetric around the intervention vector, i.e., f (α) = 2π−f (2π−α) for 0 ≤ α ≤ π. Hence, to prove that f v and f v restricted to cone(v, v ) are contractions, it is enough that we show that f restricted to the interval [0, θ] is a contraction (recall that we assumed cos 2 (θ) > 1/(2 + η)). To that end, a computation gives the formula for f f (α) = arccos (1 + η) cos α 1 + (η 2 + 2η) cos 2 α .
More computation establishes that, additionally, for every 0 ≤ α < β ≤ π/2: 1. f (α) ≤ α. In other words, applying the intervention brings vector u closer to the intervention vector.
2. f (α) < f (β), i.e., applying the intervention does not change relative ordering of vectors wrt the intervention vector.
3. If β ≤ θ * := arccos 1 2+η , then α − f (α) < β − f (β), i.e., in absolute terms, the "pull" on a vector is stronger the further away it is from the intervention vector (until the correlation reaches the threshold 1/ √ 2 + η, cf. Figure 6 ).
